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In this paper we develop a banking model to study the traditional credit and the
microcredit markets. We suppose a monopolistic traditional bank that specializes in
screening potential debtors based on their risk pro¯le and a microcredit bank that focus
on monitoring the riskier pro¯le customers. The model is calibrated with Colombian
¯nancial data. The results show that when banking provisioning depend only on the
screening level, a signi¯cant portion of the risky debtors are left out of the ¯nancial system
and the microcredit bank would not operate in certain market conditions. Nonetheless,
when we consider provisions that include monitoring considerations, the microcredit bank
would be pro¯table for the di®erent debtor risk pro¯les, and its optimal monitoring level
is higher in comparison with the one chosen by the traditional bank.
JEL Classi¯cation:D20, D23, D42, G21 and G28.
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Microcredit and micro ¯nance have increasingly gained importance in the ¯nancial systems
around the world. The ¯rst experiments in this direction, carried out by countries like
Bangladesh, India and Brazil during the seventies, successfully showed the viability of ¯nan-
cial institution that focus on low income population and exhibited positive results in terms of
pro¯tability and high repayment rates on the loans (Navaja and Tejerina (2007)). Initially,
providing credit to the portion of the population that was shed out of the traditional bank-
ing system seemed as a government, multilateral agents and non-governmental organizations
responsibility. Nonetheless, as the microcredit business became pro¯table, the private sector
started showing interest in investing in these type of banking system.
The microcredit business di®ers signi¯cantly from the intermediation activities carried out by
traditional banks. These di®erences are closely related with the idiosyncratic characteristics
of its objective population. In general terms, microcredit is de¯ned as the set of small value
loans issued to low income population that usually would not have access to the traditional
banking system due to their lack of collateral.
The Basel Committee recognizes that credit risk of the microcredit loans has di®erent deter-
minants than traditional ones, and suggests that a distinct provision and capital requirement
scheme should be impose (Basel Banking Supervision Committee (2010)). In particular, the
Committee identi¯es a set of characteristics such as the short term and small value of the
loans, the lack of guarantees, the accelerated deterioration of the credit rating and the risk
of geographical contagion, as some of the main features that in°uence the repayment level of
the microcredit loans. Micro ¯nance technology instruments are meant to mitigate this risk
by making a close follow up of the debtors and their ¯nancial conditions. It is therefore de-
sirable to consider some measure of this monitoring e®ort in the development of a regulatory
framework for microcredits.
In Colombia, microcredit was introduced formally quite recently. It was de¯ned and reg-
ulated by the Financial Superintendency (Superintendencia Financiera de Colombia) on
20001. Although currently microcredit only represents 2:5% of the total loans (Banco de la
Republica (2010)), its has gained importance as it has been growing quicker than the other
types of credit. Moreover, there is general consensus about the socioeconomically bene¯ts
of fomenting this type of credit and broadening its access (Dermigu» c-Kunt (2007))2.
Due to its intrinsic characteristics, microcredit is considered more risky than the other
types of credits. The uncertainty about the future net °ows of the microcredit customers
and the lack of collateral, increase the loans' repayment risk. To ameliorate the e®ects
1Ley 590 de 2000 and modi¯ed by Ley 905 de 2004.
2For a more thorough analysis of the current situation of microcredit and micro ¯nance in Colombia we
highly recommend (Banco de la Rep¶ ublica et al (2010)).
2of the large information uncertainty and asymmetry, microcredit institutions have to di-
vert a big portion of their resources towards monitoring the evolution of their customers
(Banco de la Rep¶ ublica et al (2010)). In contrast, traditional banks usually focus on screen-
ing their potential clients in such a way that only future debtors with ideal guarantees and
good credit history, are accepted.
Based on the above discussion, we develop a simple Monti-Klein microeconomic model (
Klein (1971) and Monti (1971)) that re°ects the traditional and the microcredit banking
systems, to study the role played by di®erent bank provisioning regulatory frameworks.
The model is calibrated using Colombian ¯nancial data. The results show that if bank
provisioning only considers the risk pro¯les of the debtors based on its screening activities,
most of the risky debtors are left out of the ¯nancial system and the microcredit bank would
not operate under some market conditions. In contrast, if provisioning takes into account
both screening and monitoring, the microcredit bank is pro¯table for any risk pro¯le debtors
and therefore an otherwise unprovided population, would have access to the ¯nancial system.
The remaining of this paper is organized as follows: in section 2 we present the model, in
section 3 we describe the main calibration strategies, in section 4 we present the results and
in section 5 we draw some conclusions and recommendations.
2 Model
In this section we describe the model that represents both the traditional and the microcredit
bank optimization problem. The main objective is to show that both banking systems are
pro¯table under some market conditions and that provisioning regulation should not be the
same for them due to the distinct nature of their businesses.
In general, a traditional bank focuses on screening and scoring the creditrisk pro¯les of their
clients before issuing loans. They spend more resources on identifying low risk customers,
than the ones used in monitoring the credit after it has been issued. In contrast, a microcredit
bank usually accepts clients that are rejected by a traditional bank, and focus its e®orts
closely monitoring them to assure the repayment of the credits issued.
In the model we denote the traditional bank with T and the microcredit bank with M. The
model is a modi¯cation of the Monti-Klein model of a monopolistic bank3. Let s denote
the screening level and m the monitoring level chosen by a given bank. Suppose that the
microcredit bank has a ¯xed minimum level of screening s and the traditional bank has a
minimum level of monitoring m. We suppose that screening level s is a continuous linear
map that associates traditional credit rating ­ := fA;B;C;D;E;Fg with the set of real
3See Freixas and Rochet (1998)
3numbers S 2 [0;5] such that s(F) = 0, s(E) = 1, s(D) = 2, s(C) = 3, s(B) = 4 y s(A) = 5
4.
We model the loans repayment proportion as a function that has the following properties,
lim
m!1p(m;s) = 1; 8s 2 S
lim
s!1p(m;s) = 1; 8m 2 M
p(0;0) = 0 ¸ 0
In particular from the above assumptions, the repayment function for the traditional banks
is given by p(m;s) ¸ 0 ,8s 2 S and for the microcredit bank p(m;s) ¸ 0, 8m 2 M 5.
Furthermore, we suppose the repayment function is,
p(m;s) = 1 ¡ e¡(m+s);
Note that since there is freedom in measuring the monitoring level, we scale it in a way
that it replicates the risk pro¯les of debtors when considering its e®ect over the repayment
function. Therefore a monitoring level of m = 5 would have the same e®ect on the repayment
function as a screening level of s = 5, the mapping of an A credit rating debtors.
2.1 Credit Demand and Deposit Supply
Following the Monti-Klein model, the monopolistic banks confront a demand function for
loans L(rb) and supply function for deposits D(rD), where b 2 fT;Mg denotes de bank's
type.To simplify the model, we assume that credit demand and deposit supply functions are
linear. Hence, we can compute the inverse credit demand and deposit supply functions a
rb(L) = rb + °bLb (1)
rD = r + °DD; (2)
4Credit rating F would re°ect debtors with a risk pro¯le such that they are not able to access the ¯nancial
system because of their idiosyncratic conditions.
5Note that function p(m;s) is not the joint distribution of m and s. It is a function that maps these
decision variables onto the space [0;1] such that it represents the repayment proportion of the credits issued.
42.2 Traditional Banks
In the maximization problem for traditional banks we impose the restriction s 2 S. We
suppose that screening acts as a ¯lter, in such a way that the debtors accepted by banks
resemble the ¯nal composition of the bank's portfolio6. This means that if a traditional bank
chooses a screening level of s = 5, all of its loan portfolio would have a credit scoring A 7.
The traditional bank solves the following maximization problem by optimally choosing the
net credit supply L ¸ 0, the deposits' demand D ¸ 0 and the screening level s 2 S.
The optimization problem of the traditional bank is8
MaxL;D;s¦ = p(m;s)(1 + rT(L))L ¡ (1 + r(D))D ¡ c(m;s); (3)
Subject to the budget constraint
(1 + Prov(s;m))L = D; (4)
where p(m;s) is the repayment function when the monitoring level m is given, c(m;s) denote
a cost function that depends both on monitoring and screening, rT(L) is the inverse of the
credit demand function and r(D) of the deposit supply function.
The budget constraint (4) shows that the sum of the total loans and the amount of provisions,
should be equal to the deposits and the bank's equity. Notice that initially we suppose
that bank provisions are dependent on both the screening level s and the monitoring level
m. When we solve the model for the traditional banks we analyze two scenarios: one in
which there are is no provisioning (Prov(m;s) = 0 8(m;s) 2 M £ S) and another in which
provisioning depends only on the screening levels (Prov(m;s) = Prov(^ m;s) 8^ m 2 M)9. In
contrast, for the microcredit bank a third scenario is considered in which provisions depend
on both monitoring and screening.
6The bank's portfolio consists of a combination of the di®erent types of credits. More formally, we can
represent this portfolio as a a±ne combination ½ = °AA+°BB+°CC+°DD+°EE 2 ^ ­ such that
P
i2­ °i = 1
and °i 2 [0;1]
7Note that the function de¯ned by s is surjective but not necessarily injective, since di®erent a±ne com-
binations of types of credits could have the same screening level. We do not pretend to investigate how the
bank chooses its portfolio (a non trivial issue) , but rather suppose that the decision variable is the screening
level s.
8This optimization problem is solved using Kuhn-Tucker conditions.
9This provisions are in line with the current regulatory framework.
52.3 Microcredit Banks
The microcredit bank solves a similar maximization problem as the traditional bank, except
that we suppose that its decision variable is the monitoring level m, taking screening s = s
as given10. The monitoring level can be any positive number, m 2 M = [0;1). Therefore
the microcredit optimization problem is
MaxL;D;m¦ = p(m;s)(1 + rM(L))L ¡ (1 + r(D))D ¡ c(m;s); (5)
subject to the budget constraint
(1 + Prov(s;m))L = D: (6)
In this case we consider three types of budget constraints: where there is no provisioning,
where provisioning depend only on screening and one in which both screening and monitoring
levels are taken into account.
3 Calibration and Methodology
We calibrated the model to match some of the Colombian ¯nancial system data. Our main
objective in this section is not accurately estimate the credit demand and deposit supply
functions, but rather have an approximation of the parameters that might determine the
linear relationship between the interest rates and equilibrium quantities. Additionally, based
on the Colombia's current regulatory framework we ¯t a continuous provisioning function
that depends on the screening s and monitoring m, and calibrate the parameters of a cost
function based on the information related with the labor and administrative costs for both
types of banks.
3.1 Credit Demand and Deposit Supply Functions
In order to calibrate the parameters in equation (1) and following Gattin-Turkalj (2007) we
estimated a simple inverse credit demand function, assuming that the equilibrium amounts
and interest rates re°ect only demand factors11. In particular we suppose that the loan inter-
10Taking screening as given is supposing that the microcredit bank faces a given type of risk pro¯le customers
and decides the optimal amount of monitoring in order to increase their repayment.
11This is a debatable assumption since the equilibrium quantities also re°ect the behavior of credit supply.
Nonetheless, since we suppose debtors are price takers and banks are monopolists, it is reasonable to assume
that the bank sets an interest rate based on the observed debtor's demand.
6est rate depends on the amount of credit demanded Lb and other exogenous macroeconomic
factors that on average determine rb of equation (1). For the traditional banks we consider








t = [1;IPIt;IBRt]0 and IPI denotes the industrial production index calculated on
monthly bases by the Department of National Statistics (DANE) and IBR the interbank
rate calculated by Colombia's Central Bank (Banco de la Rep¶ ublica) . We use monthly data
from March 2002 to August 2001 and take the logarithm of the commercial loans issued.
The results from the regressions are presented below,








Sources: DANE, Banco de la Rep¶ ublica and Superintendencia Financiera de Colombia. Authors' calculations.
As expected the commercial credit interest rate depends negatively on the amount of loans
issued 13. We calculate the elasticity parameter ^ °T = ¡0:003569. More production and
an increase in the interbanking reference rate are associated with higher interest rates. The
results also show that the one period autoregressive component of the regression is extremely
important to determine the current interest rate behavior. Since the model developed here
is static, we suppose that the exogenous variables assume the average value of the period
studied. Hence, we can calibrate the parameter rT of the simpli¯ed demand function (1)
assumed in the model, by taking the expected value on both sides of equation 10 and replacing
the average values for exogenous variables.
12Other variables where considered but where discard by the usual omitted variable test and in order to
preserve the parsimony of the model. The complete results for the regressions are presented on Appendix B
13This partially validates the assumption that observed equilibrium interest rate correspond to demand
function observations.









A + 0:8479 rT
= 0:1865: (8)
Similarly we apply the same procedure to the microcredit banking system. We estimate a








t = [1;CPIt;Et]0 as exogenous variables that a®ect the demand function for
microcredit, where CPI denotes the Consumer Price Index calculate by DANE. The results
from the regression are summarized in Table 2









Number of observation 98
Sources: DANE, Banco de la Rep¶ ublica and Superintendencia Financiera de Colombia. Authors' calculations.
Once again there is a negative sign of the coe±cient associated with the microcredit loans
issued, and the estimated parameter of equation (1) yields ^ °M = ¡0:034528.In this case,
the CPI and the IBR have a positive relationship with the interest rate and once again the
lagged value in the interest rate is a crucial determinant of its current value. Analogously
to the previous case, we calculate the value for the parameter rM = 0:442483.
To calibrate the deposit supply function we follow a somehow similar procedure. We estimate




t¡1 + °DDt + ²D
t : (10)
8The set of exogenous variables considered is XD = [1;IBR;ECI;NWI], where IBR denotes
the interbanking rate, ECI is the expected consumption index calculated by FEDESAR-
ROLLO and NWI is the nominal wages index reported by DANE. The results from the
regression are shown in Table 3.










Number of observation 98
Sources: DANE and Superintendencia Financiera de Colombia. Authors' calculations.
The results of the regression show that the deposits rate depends positively on the amount
of deposits supplied by households, hence the parameter from equation (2) is calibrated as
^ °D = 0:002483. An increase in the IBR or IPN is related to an increase in this interest
rate, whereas, an increase in the nominal wages has a negative e®ect over it. Again we see
that the e®ect of the lagged value of the deposit interest rate plays an important role in
the determination of its current level. Following the same procedure explained above, we
compute rD = 0:01993.
3.2 Provision Function
The current Colombian ¯nancial legislation sets the minimum provision level that applies to
di®erent types of credit depending on their credit risk scoring 14. Loans are divided in ¯ve
categories depending on their intrinsic credit risk and the time they are overdue. The ¯ve
categories are:
² A Category or \normal risk"
² B Category or \acceptable risk, larger than normal"
² C Category or \sensible risk"
14The law that regulates the provision system is part of the ¯nancial organic law. In particular, Annex
2 of chapter II of Resoluci¶ on 100 de 1995 issued by the Colombian Financial Superintendency, speci¯es the
minimum provision level required for each type of credit as presented in this paper. In the case of commercial
loans this is calculated based on the Credit Risk Handling System (SARC), whereas for the microcredit loans
no such system has been implemented yet.
9² D Category or \signi¯cative risk"
² E Category or \non-repayment risk".
Usually banks calculate their provisions according to the expected losses given by an inter-
nal credit risk model previously approved by the Colombian Financial Superintendency15.









Sources: Superintendencia Financiera de Colombia. Authors' calculations.
As explained above, we consider screening level s as a continuous linear function that maps
the banks portfolio onto S = [0;5]. For the construction of a provision function we ¯t a
continuous curve that minimize the distance with respect to the observations presented in
table 4 and has a rational basis17. The functions obtained for each type of credit is,
for commercial credits









In the case in which we the provision system includes monitoring and screening we suppose,




15In the colombia's regulatory framework there exists a general provisions that are not considered in this
paper. In theory this would only shift the estimated provision curve upwards.
16As noted above, the comercial credit minimum provisions are calculated considering the SARC. In par-
ticular this credit risk system takes into account the size of the ¯rm and the macroeconomic context. Also the
categories that regulate provisions di®er from the ones presented here. We calculated the matrix presented
here using the credit rating homologation explained in Annex 3 of chapter II of Resoluci¶ on 100 de 1995 and
assuming equal weights for each category, for large ¯rms in the good macroeconomic scenario.






to ¯t the curve.
103.3 Cost function
The cost function is modeled such that it re°ects the monitoring and screening costs' be-
havior. If in practice screening costs are associated with ¯ltering some type of risky debtors,
one could think that marginally this costs are relatively constant. This means that distin-
guishing between an A and a B type debtor, is the same as comparing a D from an E type.
Hence, it is reasonable to assume that the cost function c(m;s) is linear on the screening
level s. On the other hand, monitoring costs seem to increase more than proportionally as
monitoring increases, because for a given screening level the resources spent on monitoring
are marginally increasing. In particular we assume the following functional form,
c(s;m) = ·b(m½1 + s½2)Lb: (14)
From the previous discussion we suppose ½1 = 1 and ½2 = 2 18. We calibrate · = 0:001 to
illustrate the results 19.
The di®erences in the labor and administrative costs (LAC) between the traditional banking
system and the microcredit banking system suggest that microcredit banks spend more
resources in monitoring. Using data collected by the Colombian Financial Superintendency
from January 2002 to July 2010, we compare these costs between the two banking systems.
The data show that the microcredit banks' labor and administrative costs relative to their
assets are more approximately 3:053 times higher in comparison with the traditional banks20.
4 Results
In this section we present the main ¯ndings of the paper using the model calibrated with
the colombian data as described in the previous section. We present the ROA -calculated
as the bank's pro¯ts over its total loans- for both types of banks and compare them under
di®erent provisioning regulation scenarios.
In the case of the traditional bank, we ¯nd that the ROAT is always greater when there are
no provisions. This shows that when the available resources increase, the bank's pro¯ts grow
more than proportionally in comparison with the increment in the credits issued (Figure 1).
As the parameter m increases, the ROAT initially grows for both scenarios showing that very
18If this parameters are reasonably modi¯ed, the main results of this paper do not vary qualitatively if
½1 > ½2 ¸ 1.
19When · is varied it mainly a®ects the level of the ROA
b of the banks, but the conclusions do not vary
signi¯cantly.
20This calculation was carried out from January 2010 to July 2010, since it is a period where both assets
and costs of the microcredit banks have stabilized.
11low monitoring levels are not bene¯cial for the traditional bank. In fact the maximum ROAT
is attained for both scenarios near m = 0:71. When provisions are imposed, the bank's pro¯ts
are decreasing and eventually turn negative. This happens because the marginal costs of
increasing monitoring, exceeds the marginal bene¯t21.

















Figure (2) shows the optimal screening levels when the ¯xed monitoring parameter is changed.
We observe that in the model with provisions, the optimal screening level is always at its
maximum, this means that only the debtors that exhibit a low risk pro¯le are accepted by
the traditional bank (the ones that re°ect an A credit rating). In contrast, in the model
where there is no provisioning, as monitoring increases there is a substitution e®ect that
leads to the decrease of screening. In fact when the monitoring parameter surpasses m = 5
the screening level is equal to zero (a screening level related with F credit type debtors).
The results for the microcredit bank are markedly di®erent. Due to the higher average inter-
est rates, the ROAM is signi¯cantly higher for the microcredit model without provisioning
in comparison with the ROAT in the traditional model for the same scenario (Figure (1) and
Figure(3)). Note that when no provisions are imposed, the risky pro¯le debtors (associated
with credit ratings E and F) would have access to the ¯nancial system through the microcre-
dit bank and this bank will be highly pro¯table (Figure (3)). This is accompanied with high
21Note that for both scenarios, since the cost function c(m;s;L) is unbounded and the repayment function
p(m;s) is bounded by 1, when m ! 1, the optimal values of credit supply and demand will tend to zero.





















levels of monitoring that might be unattainable in practice 22. The model with provisioning
dependant on both screening and monitoring, exhibits a similar behavior. In this scenario,
the microcredit bank is pro¯table for all risk type debtors (Figure(3).In contrast, the model
in which provisions only depend on screening, the microcredit bank is unable to operate when
the customers have risky pro¯les. In fact, only after their pro¯les replicate a portfolio with
better credit rating than D, the bank starts issuing loans. This results show that a provision
system that does not take into account the positive e®ect of monitoring on the repayment
probabilities, can ruin the microcredit bank's business. If one wants to broaden the access
to the ¯nancial system by extending credits to people with riskier pro¯les, its necessary to
recognize the di®erence with the traditional banking system and accordingly apply distinct
regulatory policies that enhance the intermediation activity instead of occluding it.
If the provisions include monitoring and screening, the optimal monitoring level is higher in
comparison with the other two scenarios. This shows that a regulation focus in this manner
would motivate microcredit banks to further increase the repayment proportions, favoring
the ¯nancial system in general (Figure (4)) .
22The scaling of monitoring has been done such that its e®ect over the repayment proportion is the same as
the e®ect of scoring (which is calibrated with the mapping into the credit rating space). Therefore if m > 10
it implies that the repayment portion is very close to one, p(10;0) = 0:9999546. In practice achieving this
repayments levels is unlikely.













































5 Conclusions and Recommendations
In this paper we develop a simple microeconomic model to study traditional and microcredit
banking systems. In particular we analyze the e®ect that di®erent provision systems might
14have over both bank schemes. The results show that when the model was calibrated according
to the Colombian ¯nancial data, the provisioning system that only takes into account the
risk pro¯les of the debtors, prevents the access of some of them to the ¯nancial system and
hinders the operation of microcredit banks given some adverse market conditions. In contrast
when both monitoring and screening are considered, the microcredit bank is pro¯table for
any type of debtor they face.
This model is a ¯rst step in studying the microcredit and traditional banks interactions.
In fact, there are very interesting foreseeable extensions of the model. In the paper we
intrinsically assume that the banking systems exist independently, hence there is no relation
between them. A possible generalization of the model using game theoretic tools is to model
the strategic interactions between potential debtors and the both types of banks. In a
di®erent direction, it is also important to further investigate the way banks compose their
portfolio optimally such that it re°ects a given credit screening. In this sense, not only the
mean debtor but also the variance associated with the distinct risk pro¯le might play an
important role.
In terms of policy recommendations, the results of the model show that there are fundamental
di®erences between the two type of banks business and consequently, di®erent regulatory
policies should govern over them. Ideally provisioning has to match the bank¶s expected
losses. Since the microcredit banks use micro ¯nance technology to enhance their monitoring
activity and elevate the loan repayment levels, this should be taken into account when
thinking about a provisioning system for this type of banks. The model shows that this can
broaden signi¯cantly the access to the ¯nancial system of a population otherwise excluded
from it, without sharply increasing the credit non- repayment levels.
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